In the oil business, an undesirable event, incident or accident can put lives at risk, and cost the contractor or the customer tens of millions in lost revenues, cause damage to equipment and delays, and ultimately result in a damaged reputation costing immeasurably more.
TGS has embarked on a project to better protect all parties by investing directly in crew competence: not just technical competence, but also teamwork and organizational competence. Such gains in crew competence have been proven to reduce downtime, insurance claims, operational and capital costs and a reduction in significant events by as much as 70%.
Coming out of a period of depressed spending on exploration, the direct benefits to both TGS and its customers has been to buck the trend. We have maintained sustained operational reliability, with low reputational risk exposure and without changes to equipment or technical process, but with a full-focus on the human performance within a team and the larger organization.
TGS has been running 3D seismic vessel operations for over three decades, initially using the traditional offshore crew structure universally adopted in the offshore seismic industry at the time. This structure, historically, comprised of a vessel operation split roughly down the middle between seismic (back-deck and instrument-room) activities and maritime (engine-room, hotel, and deck) activities.
At its extremes, during the ‘bad old days’ of seismic, one could have almost cut the vessel in half along a line between the engine room and the back deck, going upwards through the vessel between the galley and the instrument room, and it would have been some time before anyone would have noticed. Well, maybe at the first mealtime the seismic crew may have realized something was missing!
In this tradition, vessel activities have been arranged around line-reporting structures, and performance was, in the main, focused around individual department technical up-time, or rather the allocation of ‘punishment’ downtime: both lagging indicators that are not always useful in predicting future performance. The success of the seismic operation as a whole was largely left to senior management to take a view, and the levers they had available to influence activities on the shop floor were limited. This often resulted in direct interaction between senior management and field crews onboard the vessels.